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ALTON R. MAYERS, 
Petitioner and Relator, 
vs. 
M. J. BRONSON, one of the Judges 
of the Third Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah, and the Third 
Judicial District Court of the State 
of Utah in and for Salt Lake County, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE. CASE 
Case No. 
6252 
Petitioner has in his brief made a statement of the 
facts of this case. Defendants will attempt to avoid un-
necessary repetition but will here make a statement of 
the pertinent facts from which the questions herein arise. 
Under date of January 8, 1940, the State Tax Com-
mission issued a subpoena commanding Alton R. Mayers, 
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one of the executors of the estate of Nellie R. Mayers, 
deceased, and one of decedent's two heirs, to appear be-
fore the State Tax Commission and bring with him certain 
books and records pertaining to a desig:t;1ated parcel of 
real property located at 41-43 Broadway, Salt Lake City. 
(Exhibit "A" attached to original Application for .Writ 
of Prohibition.) Thereafter, on January 12, 1940, before 
the return date of the. subpoena, counsel for Mr. Mayers 
wrote and informed the Tax Commission that they had 
advised their client not to respond to the subpoena. (See 
Paragraph 4 of Exhibit "F".) After the return date for 
the subpoena had gone by without the appearance of 
Alton R. Mayers, the Tax Commission, in accordance 
with the provisions of Section 104-45-15, Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 1933, reported this fact to the District Court by 
a sworn petition. (Exhibit '' B' '.) Upon the basis of this 
petition, an order was issued out of the District Court 
ordering Alton R. l\1ayers to appear and show cause why 
he should not be held in contempt for failure to obey the 
subpoena of the Tax Commission. (Exhibit "C".) In re-
sponse to this order, petitioner appeared by counsel and 
demurred to the petition and filed an Answer and Re-
sponse to the petition. (See Exhibits "E" and "F".) 
It is to be noted that the ground for the Demurrer was 
that the petition did not state facts sufficient to consti-
tute a cause of action. It is further to be noted that the 
gist of the :Itesponse and Answer of petitioner is pet~­
tioner's claim that the Tax Commission had no authority 
to issue the subpoena in question. Now here in either 
pleading does the petitioner question the jurisdiction of 
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the District Court and at no other time during any of the 
proceedings in the District Court did petitioner raise 
any question with regard to the jurisdiction of the Dis-
trict Court. 
After a hearing on the issues so made, the District 
Court, Honorable M. J. Bronson presiding, rendered its 
decision on March 23, holding that the Tax Commission 
had authority to issue the subpoena in question and that 
refusal to obey the subpoena was a contempt under Sec-
tion 104-45-15, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law were drawn, served 
upon counsel for petitioner, and filed with the. court. 
Thereafter, these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law were signed by Judge Bronson on March 28, 1940. 
No objection to any of the Findings of Fact or Con-
clusions of Law was filed by petitioner .. Thereafter, on 
1\1:arch 29, 1940, Judge Bronson adjudged petitioner to 
be guilty of contempt and ordered that he have until 
April 8, 1940 to purge himself thereof by appearing be-
fore the Tax Commission; and further ordered that if be 
did not so appear and purge himself he should appear on 
that same date for sentence on the .adjudicated contempt. 
By agreement this date was extended to May 8. There-
after, counsel for Alton R. Mayers moved to set aside 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to 
quash the order finding the petitioner to be in contempt. 
This matter was argued to the District Court and both 
motions were thereafter overruled. 
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On May 7, 1940, petitioner filed with this Court his 
Application for Writ of Prohibition on the basis of which 
this Court, ex parte, issued its Alternative Writ of Pro-
hibition. 
In answer to this Alternative Writ of Prohibition, 
defendants have filed a Demurrer and an Answer and 
Response. In this brief, defendants will urge upon this 
Court that prohibition is not a proper remedy and will 
not lie on the facts of this case under the laws of Utah. 
Inasmuch, however, as petitioner has mainly argued in 
his brief the question of the power of the Tax Commis-
sion to issue the subpoena in question, defendants will 
answer that argument and will demonstrate to this Court 
that the Tax Commission has the subpoena power in 
such a cas~ as this one. This latter argument with re-
gard to the subpoena power of the Tax Commission is 
made, however, without in any way waiving defendants' 
position that prohibition is not .a proper remedy. 
Defendants will present their position in the order 
above indicated. 
I. 
PROHIBITION IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY 
Defendants have demurred to and answered the 
Application for Writ of Prohibition. By the Demurrer, 
defendants have squarely put in issue the question of 
whether prohibition is the proper remedy in this case. 
It is submitted that prohibition is not ·a proper remedy. 
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Prohibition Lies Only to Test Jurisdiction, 
Not to Review Error. 
It is unanilnously conceded by all authorities that 
prohibition is an extraordinary legal remedy which is 
to be used sparingly and which, likewise, is to be used 
only in cases where the inferior tribunal against which 
the writ is directed is acting without or in excess of 
jurisdiction in the particular matter, or has exceeded in 
some point in the proceedings its jurisdiction. See 104-
69-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933; State ex rel. v. 
Morse, 27 Utah 336, 75 Pac. 739; Board of Home Mis-
sions v. ll!faughan, 35 Utah 516, 101 Pac. 581; Harries v. 
JJfcCrea, 62 Utah 348, 219 Pac. 533; Petition of U. S., 
263 U. S. 389, 68 L. Ed. 351; Sparkman Hardwood 
Lumber Co. v. Bush, 189 Ark. 391, 72 S. W. (2d) 527; 
People v,. Municipal Court, 359 Ill. 102, 194 N. E. 242; 
State v. Tax Commission, 129 Ohio St. Rep. 83, 193 N. E. 
751. 
In Bankers Trust Co. v. District Court, 62 Utah 432, 
220 Pac. 708, this Court refers to the writ of prohibition 
as "the most extraordinary of all the writs" to be used 
"with caution and forbearance". See also High's Extra-
ordinary Legal Remedies, Third Edition, Chapter 21. 
At Page 708, Section 764a of this authoritative work the 
following quotation is found: 
''The appropriate function of the remedy is 
to restrain the exercise of unauthorized judicial 
or quasi-judicial power, which is regarded as a 
conten1pt of the state or sovereign, and which may 
result in injury to the state or to its citizens. Three 
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conditions are necessary to warrant the granting 
of the relief: first, that the court, officer or person 
. against whom it is sought is about to exercise 
judicial or quasi-judicial power; second, that the 
exercise of such power is unauthorized by law; 
third, that it will result in injury for which no 
other adequate remedy exists.'' 
Again at Pages 708-9 in Section 765 this same au-
thority states: 
''Being an extraordinary remedy, however, 
it issues only in cases of extreme necessity, and 
before it will be granted it must appear that the 
party aggrieved has applied in vain to the in-
ferior tribunal for relief. * * * And being a 
prerogative writ, it is to be used, like all other 
prerogative writs, with great caution and forbear-
ance, for the furtherance of justice and to secure 
order and regularity in judicial proceedings, when 
none of the ordinary remedies provided by law 
are applicable. Nor should it be granted except 
in a clear case of want of jurisdiction in the court 
whose action it is sought to prohibit. And to war-
rant the relief the petition must clearly show that 
an inferior· court is about to proceed in a matter 
over which it has no jurisdiction, and unless this 
is distinctly and affirmatively shown the relief 
will not be gran ted. '' 
Again at Page 710, Section 766 of the same work, w.e 
find this statement: 
''Another distinguishing feature of the writ 
is that it is a preventive rather than a corrective 
remedy, and it issues only to prevent the com-
n1ission of a· future act, and not to undo an act 
already performed.'' 
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Quoting further from this same authority at Pages 
712 and 713, Section 767, the authority states: 
"It follows from the extraordinary nature 
of the re1nedy, as already considered, that the 
exercise of the jurisdiction is limited to cases 
where it is necessary to give a general superin-
tendence and control over inferior tribunals, and 
it is never allowed except in cases of a usurpation 
or abuse of power, and not then unless other 
existing remedies are inadequate to afford relief: 
In other words, the remedy is employed only to 
restrain courts from acting in excess of their 
powers, and if their proceedings are within the 
limits of their jurisdiction prohibition will not 
lie. If, therefore, the inferior court has juris-
diction of the subject-matter in controversy, a 
mistaken exercise of that jurisdiction or of its 
acknowledged powers will not justify a resort to 
the extraordinary remedy by prohibition.'' 
And at Pages 713-15, Sections 767a and 767b: 
''In the exercise of the jurisdiction by pro-
hibition it is important to distinguish between the 
nature of the action which it is sought to prohibit, 
and the sufficiency of the cause of action as stated 
in the proceedings in the pending litigation. The 
nature of the action itself determines the juris-
diction of the court over the subject-matter, re-
gardless of the sufficiency of its presentation or 
statement. If, therefore, the action is of such a 
nature as to fall within the jurisdiction of an in-
ferior court, prohibition will not lie merely be-
cause of insufficiency in the staternent of the cause 
of action in the pleadings, or because of insuffi-
cient proof to maintain the cause of action stated. 
So the writ will not lie to stay the prosecution of 
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an action by a city to condemn a right of way for 
a sewer, because of the want of any averment or 
proof that the city authorities have been unable 
to agree with the defendant, or because the insti-
tution of the suit was not directed by the proper 
authority. Questions of this nature do not go to 
the j'urisdiction of the inferior court, but are 
rather questions of law to be determined in the 
action there pending, and the remedy for any 
error in the action of the court upon such ques-
tions should be sought by appeal. 
"Upon an application for a writ of prohibi-
tion to stay the action of an inferior court, the sole 
question to be determined is the jurisdiction of 
that court, and the court to which the application 
is made will, for the purposes of the case, consider 
the cause of action of the plaintiff below to be such 
as he has stated in his pleadings, without investi-
gation or inquiry touching the merits of the ac-
tion. Nor will the court in which the relief is 
sought consider any errors or irregularities oc-
curring in the progress of the cause in the inferior 
court, since the writ of prohibition is not an 
appropriate remedy for the correction of errors. 
The writ will not therefore be granted to prevent 
an inferior court from proceeding with an action 
because it has sustained a demurrer to a plea set-
ting up the privilege of the defendants in the 
action to be sued in another county, the court 
in which the suit was brought having jurisdiction 
of the subject-matter. Such a question being one 
which arises in the progress of the cause of 
which the court has jurisdiction, a writ of error 
is the appropriate remedy to correct such action 
of the court, if it be erroneous. And the writ will 
not lie to determine .the title of a de facto judicial 
officer, since its only function is to prevent a 
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usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court, 
and not to determine the title of the incumbent 
of a judicial office. The title of respondent to the 
office of judge will not, therefore, be determined 
by a proceeding in prohibition to restrain him 
from the hearing of a cause, since quo warranto 
is the appropriate remedy for determining the 
title to a public office.'' 
We have quoted and will subsequently quote at 
length from High's Extraordinary Legal Remedies. The 
quotations from this authority are more aptly phrased 
and fit the case at bar better than any argument which 
your defendants could present. From the above, it ap-
pears that prohibition is not to be used in every case 
where a party feels himself to have been aggrieved by 
a lower court decision; it is to be used only where the 
lower court is acting either without or in excess of its 
jurisdiction. 
Errors of law or fact in the findings or judgment 
of the lower court cannot be tested by this writ. On this 
proposition we refer the Court to Atwood v. Cox, 88 
Utah 437, 55 Pac. (2d) 377; State ex rel. v. Morse, supra; 
Board of Home Missions v. Maughan, supra; Dunn v. 
Justice's Court, 136 Cal. App. 269, 28 Pac. (2d) 690; 
Lindsey v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 37, 279 Pac. 
837 and cases there cited. See also High's, supra, p. 720, 
sec. 772. 
vVe submit that there can be no question as to the 
District Court's jurisdiction in this matter. In this con-
nection, the Court i~ informed that after the Tax Com-
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mission issued. its subpoena it received a letter from 
counsel for the petitioner stating that on advice of 
counsel petitioner would not comply with the subpoena. 
Thereupon, and after the return date of the subpoena 
went by without appearance of petitioner in conformance 
therewith, the Tax Commission in accordance with the 
statutory duties placed upon it by Section 104-45-15, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, reported that action to 
the District Court. Section 104-45-15 provides in part 
as follows: 
''Whenever * * * any person duly subpoenaed 
to appear and give evidence or to produce any 
books or papers shall neglect or refuse to appear 
or to produce such books or papers * * * he shall be 
deemed in contempt, (of the officer issuing the 
subpoena) and it shall be the duty of the person, 
officer * * * board * * * to report the fact to the 
judge of the district court of the county, * * *.'' 
(Italics and parenthetical insertion ours.) 
Strictly in accordance with that statutory provision, 
the Tax Commission reported the fact of the failure of 
petitioner to comply with the subpoena to the District 
Court of Salt Lake County. 
Section 104-45-15 then further provides that upon 
such report to the Judge he shall issue either a warrant 
of attachment or order to show cause. Section 104-45-16 
goes on to provide that when the person charged has 
appeared, the same proceedings shall be had as in any 
other contempt matter. Clearly, therefore, under these 
statutory provisions contained in Chapter 45, Title 104, 
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Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, the District Court is 
given jurisdiction, and exclusive jurisdiction, to hear and 
determine contempt proceedings in connection with sub-
poenas issued by other than judicial officers. When the 
petitioner herein appeared in response to the order to . 
show cause issued by Judge Bronson, petitioner demur-
red to the petition o£ the Tax Commission and also 
answered and responded to the petition. Upon a hearing 
duly had the Court found that the Tax Commission had 
lawfully exercised the subpoena power in accordance 
with its statutory duties and authority. A reading of 
petitioner's brief submitted in this matter clearly demon-
strates that petitioner's only complaint before this Court 
is that Judge Bronson's ruling in this regard was er-
roneous. Petitioner at no time in any of the proceedings 
before the District Court raised the question of the 
jurisdiction. Neither does petitioner directly raise that 
question here. That question is raised only inferentially 
before this Court in connection with its application for 
a writ of prohibition. It is not argued in petitioner's 
brief. In other words, petitioner in the proceeding before 
the District Court came into court without making ob-
jection to the jurisdiction of the District Court, proceeded 
to a hearing on the merits and submitted the matter on its 
merits, the sole issue being, was the Tax Commission 
empowered to issue the subpoena in question. After an 
adverse determination on the merits of this issue, peti-
tioner now attempts to prohibit the action of the District 
Court presumably as being beyond its jurisdiction. Ob-
viously, petitioner ;never considered that the District 
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Court was acting without jurisdiction in this matter but 
now feels itself aggrieved by what it considers to be an 
erroneous decision on the fundamental issue, namely, 
the subpoena power of the Tax Commission. We submit 
that petitioner cannot test the correctness of the lower 
court's decision by this writ of prohibition. The only 
question which petitioner is entitled to raise before this 
Court on application for writ of prohibition is whether 
or not the District Court had jurisdiction to hear the 
controversy. That question, it is submitted, is conclusive-
ly determined against the petitioner by the statutory 
provisions contained in Chapter 45, Title 104, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933. 
In Crowther v. District Court, 93 Utah 586, 54 Pac. 
(2d) 243, this Court had before it much the same question 
as is presented by the case at bar. In that case, peti-
tioners were the defendants in an action pending in the 
District Court. The plaintiff in that. action caused a 
notice to be served on petitioners' counsel that their 
depositions were to be taken. Neither of the petitioners 
appeared in response to that notice. The plaintiff in the 
action then petitioned the District Court for an order 
to ·petitioners to show cause why petitioners should not 
be required to submit to examination and have their 
depositions taken. The petitioners appeared in response 
to this order to show cause and expressed their willing-
ness to have their depositions taken but said that they 
would not appear before the notary unless their statutory 
witness and mileage fees were paid. The District Court 
ruled that under the circumstances, witness and mileage 
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fees need not be paid and ordered the petitioners to 
appear and have their depositions taken. The order 
setting the time and place for the depositions was served 
upon the petitioners. Counsel for petitioners then ad-
vised them that they were not required to appear and 
give testimony unless their witness and mileage fees were 
paid. Depending upon this advice, petitioners again 
failed to appear. Upon a showing made of these facts 
before the District Court, the District Court issued a 
citation directing petitioners to appear and show cause 
why tliey should not be punished for contempt. Pur-
suant to that citation, the petitioners appeared and ob-
jected to the jurisdiction of the court and moved that 
the citation be quashed. While this motion was under 
advisement by the District Court, the petitioners obtain-
ed an alternative writ of prohibition from this Court 
directed to .the District Judge. The Court recalled and 
vacated the alternative writ of prohibition and denied 
the petition for a permanent writ of prohibition. In 
the course of its opinion, this Court stated the following 
rules at pages 594-5 of 93 Utah: 
''Petitioners do not contend that the court 
below was without authority to issue the citation 
requiring Messrs. Cro\vther and Jorgenson to 
appear before the district court and show cause 
why they should not appear and testify before a 
notary public. That such a procedure is proper 
was expressly held by this court in the case of 
Woolley v. Wight, 65 Utah 619, 238 P. 1114, 41 
A. L. R. 433. They did not appear pursuant to 
the citation and after a hearing was had the 
court directed that they appear before a notary 
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public at a time and place fixed in the order. Their 
claim that they were entitled to payment in ad-
vance of their witness and mileage fees was decid-
ed against them. We are not here concerned with 
the question of whether the court was, or was not, 
in error in concluding that they were not entitled 
to their mileage and witness fees. In a proceeding 
for a writ of prohibition we may not review mat-
ters involving mere error. Moreover, the mere 
fact that the court may have been in error in 
concluding that Messrs. Crowther and Jorgenson 
were not entitled to witness fees did not justify 
them in refusing to obey the order of February 
28th. 
'* * * Disobedience of an order made 
by a court within its jurisdiction and 
power is a contempt, although the order 
may be clearly erroneous.' 13 C. J. 15. 
''Numerous cases supporting the text just 
quoted are collected in the footnote. Upon the 
issuance of the citation and the hearing had on 
the order to show cause why Messrs. Crowther 
and Jorgenson should not appear and testify, 
the court below had jurisdiction over their per-
sons, and likewise had the power to determine 
the controversy in that proceeding. The mere 
fact that the court may have erred did not oust 
it of jurisdiction. * * *" (Italics ours.) 
We submit that this case clearly establishes the rule 
in this state that error of the type herein alleged cannot 
be reviewed upon a writ of prohibition. We further 
maintain that the Crowther case, supra, is direct author-
ity for the proposition contended for by defendants 
herein, that prohibition is not a proper or available 
remedy to petitioner. 
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The san1e fundamental principles were announced 
and recognized as the la"' by this Court in the case of 
Atwood v. Cox, supra. 
The Question of Jurisdiction Must Have Been Raised 
in the Court Whose Proceedings It Is Sought to 
Prohibit or Prohibition Will Not Issue from 
the Superior Court. 
As has been stated above, petitioner at no time in 
the District Court in any manner raised any question 
as to the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear and 
determine the controversy. While it may be true as a 
general proposition that the question of jurisdiction over 
the subject matter of the controversy may be raised at 
any time, it is also a recognized principle that in con-
nection with an application for a writ of prohibition 
the petitioner, as a condition precedent to be entitled to 
the writ, must have raised the question of jurisdiction 
in the lower court. See High's Extraordinary Legal 
Remedies, Page 722, Sections 773 and 773a. 
This rule has been recognized by this Court and 
announced as the law of this jurisdiction in the case 
of Sammis v. Marks, 69 Utah 26, 252 Pac. 270, where 
this court said at page 38 of 69 Utah: 
"It is the general rule that prohibition will 
not issue to arrest proceedings unless the atten-
tion of the court, whose proceedings are sought 
to be arrested, was called to the alleged excess 
of jurisdiction.'' 
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See also State v. Telford, 93 Utah 228 at 232-3, 72 
Pac. (2d) 626. 
This same rule, namely, that lack or excess of jur-
isdiction must be raised in the trial court whose proceed-
ings are sought to be arrested before prohibition will 
issue from a superior court, has been laid down in the 
fallowing cases : 
State ex rel. Scollard v. District Court, 47 Mont. 
284, 132 Pac. 21; 
State ex rel. Mays v. Breckenridge, 43 Okla. 711, 
142 Pac. 407; 
State ex rel. Poston v. District Court, 31 Wyo. 
413, 227 Pac. 378; 
State ex rel. McPherson Bros. Co. v. Superior 
Court, 139 Wash. 294, 247 Pac. 3; 
People v. Public Utilities Commission, 81 Colo. 
361, 255 Pac. 608; 
Baird v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. 408,268 Pac. 640; 
Phillips v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 622, 293 
Pac. 661; 
Bank of America, etc., v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 
App. (2d) 333, 86 Pac. (2d) 144. 
See also Baughman v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. 572, 
14 Pac. 207, 208, where the rule is stated as follows: 
"It has been repeatedly held here that pro-
hibition will not go from this court unless the 
attention of the court, whose proceedings are 
sought to be arrested, has been called to the al-
·Ieged excess of jurisdiction. Southern P.R. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 59 Cal. 4 75. '' 
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Therefore, having failed to attack in any way the 
District Court's jurisdiction or even suggest lack or 
excess of jurisdiction before the District Court, petitioner 
is not entitled to the ''"'rit requested of this Court. 
Prohibition Will Lie Only Where There Is No 
Other Adequate Remedy in the Ordinary 
Course of Law. 
It is a further recognized principle universally ap-
plied that prohibition is granted, first, as stated above, 
only to test jurisdiction but also, second, only in cases 
where the usual and ordinary form of appellate remedy 
provided by law does not provide adequate relief. See 
High's Extraordinary Legal Remedies, pages 716, etc., 
Sections 770, 771, 771a and 772. In Section 770, supra, 
the rule is laid down in the following language: 
''And it is a principle of universal application, 
and one which lies at the very foundation of the 
law of prohibition, that the jurisdiction is strictly 
confined to cases where no other remedy exists, 
and it is always a sufficient reason for withhold-
ing the writ that the party aggrieved has another 
and complete remedy at law. The doctrine holds 
good, even though the order of the court which 
is sought to be stayed or prevented is erroneous." 
(Italics ours.) 
In Section 772, supra, the author states as follows: 
''The proper function of a prohibition being to 
check the usurpations of inferior tribunals, and 
to confine them within the limits prescribed for 
their operation by law, it does not lie to prevent 
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a subordinate court from deciding erroneously, 
or from. enforcing an erroneous judgment in a 
case in which it has a right to adjudicate." 
On the proposition that prohibition will not lie where 
appeal after judgment will constitute an adequate 
remedy, see also Bankers Trust Company v. District 
Court, supra; August Belmont & Company v. Superior 
Court, 117 Cal. App. 450, 4 Pac. (2d) 158; Holland v. 
Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 523, 9 Pac. (2d) 531; 
Plocher v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 337, 26 Pac. 
(2d) 841; Struck v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. App. 672, 
32 Pac. (2d) 1110; Fitts v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. (2d) 
514, 51 Pac. (2d) 66, 102 A. L. R. 290 and annotation at 102 
A. L. R. 298 et seq. 
Applying these princi pies to the case at bar, there 
is immediately disclosed an additional reason why pro-
hibition is not the proper remedy. We have established 
that the court below had jurisdiction of the matter in 
controversy. It proceeded to a judgment in the form of 
an order based upon findings of fact and conclusions of 
hiw in which the court found that the Tax Commission 
has the subpoena power, and that the subpoena had been 
properly issued and served. The petitioner herein then 
had available to him immediately a complete and ade-
quate remedy in the ordinary course by appeal as pro-
vided by our laws. Appeal to this Court from the order 
of the District Court would have enabled the petitioner 
to properly raise before this Court the question of the 
correctness in law and fact of the District Court's find-
ings and ruling. In this connection attention is called 
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to Pages 2, 3 and 4 of petitioner's brief. There the peti-
tioner discloses the whole theory of his complaint before 
this Court. He states eight errors 'vhich he alleges the 
court below made; but note that petitioner refers to 
the court's action as erroneous and states: 
"The following is a statement of the errors 
upon which petitioner relies for a reversal of 
the order of the defendant court. The court 
erred:***.'' 
After the quoted statement petitioner states what 
amounts to eight assignments of error. By this statement 
petitioner has disclosed that in actuality and stripped of 
all legal terminology he is asking this Court on a writ 
of prohibition to reverse the decision of the trial court 
on the question whether the Tax Commission has the 
power to issue the subpoena herein. We submit that 
since· petitioner is contending before this Court solely 
that error was committed by the District Court, peti-
tioner, by his own statements, demonstrates that he is 
attempting to substitute this writ of prohibition for the 
proper available remedy, namely, appeal to this Court 
from the findings and order of the District Court. 
See State ex rel. McPherson Brothers Company v. 
Superior Court, supra, also on the proposition that pro-
hibition will not lie after judgment has been rendered in 
the court whose proceedings it is sought to prohibit. 
Furthermore, petitioner would not have needed to 
wait until sentenced by the District Court but could 
have appealed from the order of the District Court ad-
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judging him to be in contempt. That such an order was 
a final judgment or appealable order has been indicated 
by this Court in the case of In re Thomas, 56 Utah 315, 
190 Pac. 952; see also Shurtz v. Thorley, 90 Utah 381, 
61 Pac. (2d) 1262; Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 
Utah 426, 73 Pac. (2d) 1277; North Point etc. Co. v. 
Utah & S. L. Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, 46 Pac. 824; Vol. 
2, Am. Jur., pages 858, 860, 861 and 862. 
Petitioner in his brief attempts to argue to this 
Court that prohibition should here lie because appeal 
would not serve as an adequate remedy. The only in-
adequacy disclosed or claimed by petitioner apparently 
is that had he refused to appear before the Tax Com-
mission and purge- himself, he would have been sen-
tenced by the court on the contempt adjudication. Grant-
ing that to be true and granting for the sake of argu-
ment that he could not have appealed without being sen-
tenced, we submit that none of the arguments advanced 
by petitioner shows inadequacy of the remedy by appeal. 
In the first place such a sentence by the court on the 
finding of contempt would not, as plaintiff says, have 
been a quasi-criminal conviction. This Court has clearly 
and authoritatively recognized the difference between 
civil and criminal contempt. See authorities cited infra. 
Under the rule announced by this Court and under the 
rule recognized by other courts this contempt was a civil 
contempt only, and the finding of the petitioner in con-
tempt in no way besmirched him with a criminal or quasi-
criminal conviction. Had he waited for sentence to appeal, 
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the appeal "rould have immediately stayed execution of the 
sentence, and pending determination by this Court, the 
petitioner could have been in no way punished for the 
conten1pt. Snu~th v. J(·imball, 76 Utah 350, 289 Pac. 588, 
70 A. L. R. 101; High's, supra, P. 745, Sec. 789. We, 
therefore, submit there is no exigency demonstrated in 
this case nor any emergency which would justify this 
Court under any so-called liberalized recognition of the 
writ of prohibition in granting such writ where, as in 
this case, the right of appeal in the regular and ordinary 
manner would have fully and adequately protected pe-
titioner's rights. 
It is settled beyond question in this jurisdiction by 
deci~ions of this Court that appeal will lie from a judg-
ment finding a person in contempt. Herald-Republican 
Publishing Company v. Lewis, 42 Utah 188, 129 Pac. 
624; In re Thomas, supra; Bankers Trust Company v. 
District Court, supra. 
Even more specifically, this Court has, almost from 
its inception, recognized a distinction between a '' crim-
inal contempt" and a "civil contempt" and has held 
that in the case of a civil contempt, appeal will lie from 
a judgment of contempt. Snow v. Snow, 13 Utah 15, 43 
Pac. 620; Ex Parte Whitmore, 9 Utah 441, 35 Pac. 524; 
28 A. L. R. 50 et seq., especially at Page 56; see also 
Rapalje on Contempt, Sec. 21, Pages 25-6. The distinc-
tion so recognized by our Court and substantiated by 
practically all authorities on the subject is that a crim-
inal contempt occurs where the act being punished as a 
.•' 
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contempt was an act in disrespect of a court's order; a 
civil contempt, on the other hand, is a contempt where 
the contemnor fails or refuses to do something which 
he is ordered to do by the court and which is still in his 
power to perform. Stated otherwise, criminal contempt 
occurs by the commission of an act which is forbidden 
and thereby the harm (either damage to another party 
or the disrespect of the court) is irrevocably accomplish-
ed; whereas, a civil contempt occurs where the contemnor 
is ordered to perform a certain act and refuses to do so 
to the disadvantage of the party for whose advantage 
the commission of the act is ordered. See also 12 Am. 
,Tur., Page 392. Applying these principles to the case at 
bar, it is readily seen that the contempt in this case is 
a civil contempt and in no way even smacks of a criminal 
or quasi-criminal proceeding. 
In Snow v. Snow, supra, and Ex Parte Whitemore, 
supra, this Court has laid down a rule which has never 
. been questioned in our jurisdiction, and the rule is fol-
lowed in practically all other jurisdictions, that appeal 
will lie from a judgment finding a person to be guilty 
of a civil contempt. These same cases also seem to lay 
down the rule that appeal will not lie from a conviction 
of criminal contempt. This may be an additional reason 
why, in the cases cited by petitioner at Pages 6 to 9 of 
his brief, prohibition was granted. In each of those 
cases, except Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 Pac. (2d) 
920, the contempt involved was a criminal contempt. In 
Allen v. Lindbeck, the situation presented a ease where 
the petitioner would have been besmirched with the 
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stigma of a quasi-criminal conviction. Furthermore, in 
Evans v. Evans, -- Utah --, 98 Pac. (2d) 703, the 
'vrit of prohibition was refused. It is also worthy of note 
that in both the Allen v. Lindbeck and Evans v. Evans 
cases, the parties agreed that this Court might consider 
the cases on their merits and raised no question as to 
whether prohibition was the proper remedy. Where the 
parties to the action agree that a particular procedure 
adopted may be considered as the proper procedure, a 
court may be justified in not, of its own motion, raising 
the question whether the procedure is proper. However, 
where an attack is made on the procedure adopted, as 
we here attack the resort to prohibition, we submit that 
the court is not justified in assuming to decide questions 
of error on any theory announced in any case where 
parties to the litigation consented to the court's consider-
ing the merits of the case on a writ of prohibition. 
From the above citation of authorities, there can 
be no question but that the petitioner in this case had 
a complete and adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of law by appeal to this Court from the judgment of the 
District Court. In this same connection, we specifically 
direct the court's attention to the fact that nowhere in 
petitioner's brief does petitioner make one statement 
with regard to any claim of lack of jurisdiction in the 
District Court. Petitioner's sole and only defense of the 
use of the writ of prohibition in this situation is a 
nebulous anfi unsupported claim that there does not exist 
an adequate remedy other than by prohibition. We sub-
mit that on this set of circumstances, this Court cannot 
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do otherwise than dismiss the alternative writ of pro-
hibition issued and refuse to issue any further writ of 
prohibition. We submit further that we have conclusively 
demonstrated that petitioner had available to him an 
adequate remedy by appeal. 
This Court has, by decision, also broadened the rem-
edy of writ of certiorari to include not only a review of 
the question of jurisdiction but also a review of error in 
the court below. See Herald-Republican Publishing Com-
pany v. Lewis, supra, at Page 211 of 42 Utah; Olson v. 
District Court, 93 Utah 145, 71 Pac. (2d) 529. 
Therefore, with not only the remedy by appeal 
available but also a remedy by certiorari, it would appear 
doubly certain that petitioner in the case at bar has no 
basis for attempting to proceed by prohibition. 
In fact, we submit that, in the absence of such special 
circumstances as will create an emergency of a type 
certainly not pre sen ted here, this Court has held that 
prohibition will not lie to review a judgment or proceed-
ing in contempt. In Bankers Trust Company v. District 
Court, supra, this Court laid down the following prin-
ciples at Page 435: 
''Plaintiff prays for a writ of prohibition, 
prohibiting and enjoining defendants from issu-
ing any commitment for contempt or from further 
proceeding upon said order of July 10, 1923. An 
alternative writ of prohibition was issued and 
Rerved, whereupon the defendants filed a motion 
to quash the alternative writ and to dismiss the 
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proceedings, because the facts stated are insuffi-
cient to justify a \Yri t of prohibition or to con-
stitute a cause of action. 
''The motion must be sustained. It is very 
doubtful ,, ... hether the case presents a question of 
jurisdiction at all. Bd. of Home Missions v. 
~Iaughan, 35 Utah, 516, 101 Pac. 581. It is not 
denied that the district court has the legal power 
to render a judgment against a garnishee, upon 
regular service of a writ of garnishment and the 
answer of the garnishee in a proper case. The 
objection here is rather to the effect that the 
district court erroneously construed the answer 
as being sufficient to authorize the judgment and 
erroneously declined to set the judgment aside. 
But we pass that question, as the action must be 
determined by a principle upon which we enter-
tain no doubt. 'The writ of prohibition is a pre-
rogative writ, the most extraordinary of all the 
writs, and is ''to be used with caution and for-
bearance." ' Campbell v. Durand, 39 Utah 118, 
115 Pac. 986. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 7408, 
provides: 
'It may be issued by the Supreme 
Court, or by a district court or a judge 
thereof, to an inferior tribunal, or to a 
corporation, board, or person, in all cases 
where there is not a plain, speedy, and 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of 
law.' 
''In garnishment proceedings, the garnishee 
has a right of appeal from all final judgments or 
orders the same as in other civil cases. Comp. 
Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 6753. The order complained 
of was made July 10, 1923. The application for 
the writ of prohibition herein was filed October 
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6, 1923, at which time the plaintiff had and still 
has a clear right of appeal. This court has repeat-
edly held that the writ of prohibition will not lie 
for grievances which n1ay be redressed in the 
ordinary course of law by appeal." 
This Court then quashed the alternative writ of 
prohibition and dismissed the prohibition proceedings. 
We submit that the principles announced in that case 
govern the case at bar and that the alternative writ 
issued out of this Court should be dismissed. 
The correct and proper procedural use of the writ 
of prohibition is strikingly illustrated by the case of 
Jones v. Cox, 84 Utah 568, 37 Pac .. (2d) 777- ''strik-
ingly illustrated", we say, because there the petitioner 
objected in the very first stages of the proceedings to 
the jurisdiction of the court; when the court overruled 
his objection, petitioner immediately sued out his writ 
to prevent any further proceedings; and the writ was 
directed to the agency initiating the proceedings, namely, 
the court. In the case at bar, on the other hand, peti-
tioner made no jurisdictional objection in the court be-
low ; he waited until the court decided against him on 
the merits; he allowed the court to proceed to consider 
and determine the merits without jurisdictional objec-
tion; and he is not attempting to prohibit the only 
agency which he at any time alleges or claims has acted 
without jurisdiction-the Tax Commission-but he is 
attempting to prohibit the District Court against whom 
his only complaint is that it committed error in its deter-
mination on the merits. 
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In Woolley v. lVight, 65 Utah 619, 238 Pac. 1114, 
this Court held that "There an affidavit reported to the 
District Court the fact of a person's having refused to 
appear before a notary public and have his deposition 
taken after notice according to statute, the District 
Court to whom such report is made not only has juris-
diction but is duty bound to order such person to show 
cause why he should not be punished for contempt for. 
such refusal and a writ of mandamus was issued by 
this Court to compel the District Court to issue such 
order to show cause and proceed to hear the contempt 
matter. Prohibition in our State is by statute declared to 
be the counterpart of mandamus. See 104-69-1, R. S. U. 
1933. We submit that it is impossible to say in one breath 
that a District Court may be forced by mandamus to hear 
a contempt proceeding and yet in the same type of case 
(contempt of a non-judicial officer under Sec. 104-45-15, 
R. S. U., 1933) could be prohibited as not having juris-
diction to hear and determine such a case. 
Petitioner is asking this Court, as evidenced by the 
last statement in his brief, to reverse the judgment of 
the lower court. It is fundamental that prohibition will 
not lie to prevent the doing of something already done; 
it will not lie to require the person to whom it is ad-
dressed to do some act. Brooks v. Warren, 5 Utah 89, 
12 Pac. 659. Therefore, by the same reasoning, it cer-
tainly will not lie to reverse action already taken by a 
District Court. Appeal is the method provided by our 
system of jurisprudence to achieve that result. See also 
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1-l igh 's, supra, Page 724, Sec. 77 4; State ex rel. v. Superi-
or Court, 139 Wash. 294, 247 Pac. 3. Prohibition may 
be used only to arrest proceedings before termination. 
Petitioner Is Attempting to Prohibit 
the Wrong Agency 
In further support of our position that prohibition 
IS not a proper remedy, we call the Court's attention 
to the fact that petitioner, in this case, plainly is attempt-
ing to prohibit the wrong agency. As demonstrated 
above, the District Court has jurisdiction to hear con-
tempt matters. The contempt is based upon the subpoena 
issued by the Tax Commission. The District Court, thus, 
comes into the picture only as the adjudicator on the 
question of whether the action of the petitioner con-
stituted a contempt. The instigator of the proceeding 
was the Tax Commission. It was that Commission which 
issued the subpoena, and if any one under any theory 
was acting beyond its jurisdiction, it was the Tax Com-
mission and not the District Court. 
Granting, solely for the sake of argument, that the 
Tax Commission was without power to issue the sub-
poena in question, then we submit that the Tax Com-
mission was the agency acting beyond its jurisdiction 
and not the District Court. Under that assumption, the 
District Court has erroneously found that the Tax Com-
mission had the subpoena power, but such finding is 
merely error within its jurisdiction and not a lack of 
jurisdiction to make the finding. 
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\\TI!en the subpoena 'vas served upon Alton R. May-
ers, counsel for the petitioner, as den1onstrated by Para-
graph-! of Exhibit F, attached to petitioner's application 
for "~rit of prohibition, notified the Tax Commission that 
petitioner would not respond to the subpoena because 
counsel considered the Tax Commission to be without 
authority to issue that subpoena. We submit that im-
mediately upon having the subpoena served upon him~ 
petitioner 'vas in a position to test the Tax Commission's 
power to issue that subpoena by securing an alternative 
writ of prohibition against the Tax Commission. By pro-
ceeding in that manner, petitioner probably could have 
raised the question he is here attempting to raise, namely, 
the Tax Commission's power to issue the subpoena. But, 
assuming that petitioner had availed himself of what 
we submit would have been the only proper use of the 
writ of prohibition by securing sucH alternative writ 
against the Tax Commission, and had the Court found, 
as the Court did find in this proceeding, that the Tax 
Commission had the power to issue the subpoena, then 
we submit that certainly there would be no question as 
to the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear a peti-
tion of the Tax Commission directed to enforcing its 
subpoena by a contempt citation as done here. This 
further demonstrates that there was no lack of juris-
diction in the District Court to hear this rna tter. 
In this same connection let us refer to the cases 
cited by petitioner at Pages 6 to 9, inclusive, of his brief. 
In ev~ry one of the cases cited by petitioner in support 
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of his proposition that prohibition is the proper remedy, 
the prohibition was directed to the agency or person 
initiating the proceeding. In State v. Circuit Court, 97 
Wis. 1, 72 N. W. 193, the writ of prohibition was directed 
to the District Judge. He, upon his own motion and 
findings, had adjudicated the petitioner there to be in 
contempt. 
In Smith v. Kimball, supra, the writ of prohibition 
was directed to the Judge who had attempted to find 
the petitioner in contempt for failure to abide by the 
judgment of that court when that judgment had been 
appealed and was pending on appeal. 
In Dickey v. Brokaw, 53 Ohio App. 141, 4 N. E. (2d) 
411, the petitioner secured the writ of prohibition against 
the notary public issuing the subpoena, not against any 
District Court. In other words, in the Dickey v. Brokaw 
case petitioner had done what we say petitioner must 
have done here in order to properly avail himself of the 
writ of prohibition, namely, direct the writ to the person 
or agency issuing the subpoena and not wait until the 
matter was presented to the District Court for adjudica-
tion and then attempt to prohibit the District Court. 
In Allen v. Lindbeck, supra, the writ was directed to 
the justice of the peace who had issued the warrant. 
In the case of Evans v.~ Evans, supra, the writ of 
prohibition was not made permanent, but in any event 
it was directed to the District Judge who had ordered the 
petitioner to produce certain books and records. 
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As stated, in every one of these cases, cited by peti-
tioner, the writ of prohibition was directed to the agency 
or person initiating the matter by issuing the subpoena, 
the warrant, or on his own motion finding a person in 
contempt. All of these cases, it is submitted, support 
only the proposition that a writ of prohibition in this 
case might lie against the Tax Commission. None of 
them supports the issuance of a writ of prohibition 
against the District Court hearing a contempt under 
104-45-15, R. S. U., 1933. 
Summary 
To follow petitioner's argument to its logical con-
clusion and to succinctly state the entire gist of peti-
tioner's argument and the conclusion to be arrived at, 
the result would be as follows: 
Since the Tax Commission has no jurisdiction or 
power to issue the subpoena in question, the District 
Court is without jurisdiction to hear or determine the 
question of the power of the Tax Commission to issue 
the subpoena in question. We submit that, stripped of 
all unnecessary verbiage, the above is a fair, compact 
statement of the position which petitioner must take in 
order to sustain his claim that prohibition is a proper 
remedy. We further submit that the mere statement of 
the proposition serves to demonstrate its fundamental 
error. 
Furthermore, to follow the position which plaintiff 
must take in order to sustain its use of the remedy 
of prohibition-namely, that the District Court lacked 
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jurisdiction or acted in excess of jurisdiction-we reach 
this anomalous result: The question of the Tax Com-
mission's power to issue a subpoena in such a case as this 
could never be tested because if the District Court is 
without jurisdiction to hear the matter, then the ques-
tion of the Commission's power could never be judicially 
determined unless the petitioner were to attempt to pro-
hibit the Commission itself from issuing a subpoena or 
proceeding further on a subpoena issued. The Tax Com-
mission would be powerless to compel any individual to 
bring prohibition against it to test its power and thus, 
to follow the plaintiff's position again to its logical con-
clusion, there never could be a determination of the ques-
tion. 
The statement of the result of plaintiff's position in 
this case serves to illustrate further the soundness of 
the position here taken by the defendants, that the de-
fendants have complete and plenary jurisdiction to hear 
and determine the question of the power of the Tax Com-
mission to issue the subpoena. If defendants have er-
roneously decided that question in favor of the Tax 
Commission, the correctness of defendants' ruling should 
be, as in all other cases under our system of juris-
prudence, tested in the orderly, regular fashion by 
appeal to this Court asking this Court to review the 
judgment of the District Court and to reverse the same 
if error be found. 
To summarize briefly, we submit that upon each of 
the following grounds considered alone and certainly 
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upon the basis of all of them combined, defendants have 
conclusively shown that prohibition is not a proper reme-
dy in the case at bar: 
1. Petitioner makes no claim that there was any 
lack, or action in excess, of jurisdiction in the District 
Court. Prohibition will lie only in cases where the court 
against "'"hom the writ is directed is acting in excess of 
or without jurisdiction. 
2. Defendants have clearly demonstrated that the 
District Court had jurisdiction to hear and. determine 
the controversy in question. Petitioner's only grievance 
before this Court is a claim that the District Court com-
mitted error in its finding of power in the Tax Com-
mission to issue the subpoena in question. Prohibition 
will not lie to review or correct error in the action of 
the court below. 
3. Prohibition will not lie if any other adequate 
remedy is available to petitioner in the ordinary course 
of law. Both appeal and certiorari were open to the 
petitioner and either would have constituted a com-
pletely adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 
5. Prohibition will not lie to prevent the doing of 
something already done. Petitioner is here specifically 
asking this Court for relief in only one form-reversal 
of the action already taken by the District Court. Pro-
hibition will not lie to reverse action already taken. 
6. In any event, petitioner has misconceived the 
purpose of the writ by failing to direct it to the agency 
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against which prohibition might be a proper remedy. 
Under petitioner's own theory of the case, the Tax Com-
mission is the only agency against which the petitioner 
makes any claim to have acted beyond its jurisdiction. 
If prohibition is a proper remedy in this situation at all, 
it would be proper only when ·directed to the Tax Com-
mission. Therefore, having attempted to prohibit the 
wrong agency, prohibition will not lie in this case. 
It is, therefore, our position that not only has 
petitioner failed to recite any authority in support of 
his position that prohibition is the proper remedy, but 
that the authorities cited by the petitioner, on the con-
trary, support the view urged by defendants, that pro-
hibition is not the proper remedy when directed to the 
District Court in this situation. We, therefore, strongly 
urge upon this Court that prohibition is not the proper 
remedy, that defendants' demurrer should be sustained, 
the alternative writ dismissed and that this Honorable 
Court refuse to issue the pexmanent writ of prohibition. 
II. 
THE TAX COMMISSION HAS THE POWER TO 
ISSUE THE SUBPOENA IN QUESTION 
Because substantially all of petitioner's brief is 
directed to the proposition that the Tax Commission was 
without authority to issue the subpoena in question and 
solely for that reason and without in any way waiving 
the position heretofore urged, the defendants will here 
demonstrate that the Tax Commission was empowered 
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to issue the subpoena in question. By making this argu-
ment 've do not concede that the question of the Tax 
Commission's subpoena power is properly before this 
Court but on the contrary urge that the question is not 
properly before this Court and should not be considered 
in the decision rendered by this Court. 
The Tax Commission Has the Subpoena Power 
by Direct Grant 
Petitioner in his brief. has, we submit, set up a 
straw man for the purpose of knocking it down and thus 
making what appears to be an argument before this 
Court. The straw man is that the Tax Commission 
claims the subpoena power by implication. Such is not 
the fact. The Tax Commission has at all times taken 
the position that the subpoena which it issued to peti-
tioner in this case was issued by reason of a direct 
grant of subpoena power. 
The Tax Commission was created by amendment 
to the Constitution of our State which became effective 
November 4, 1930. Among other things, this Constitu-
tional amendment provides that the TaX! Commission 
'' * * * shall administer and supervise the tax laws of 
the State* * *" and "* * *shall* * *have such other 
powers as may be prescribed by the I_Jegislature," Ar-
ticle XIII, Sec. 11, Constitution of Utah. Pursuant to 
this amendment, the Legislature of 1931 clothed this 
constitutionally created body and gave it life. Chapter 
53, Laws of Utah, 1931. Section 5983 of that chapter 
designated the number of commissioners, the terms of 
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office, etc. Section 5984 outlined the powers and duties 
of the Tax Commission in substantially the same form 
as they now appear in Section 80-5-46, Revised Statutes, 
of Utah, 1933. Having been constitutionally charged 
with the duty of administering and supervising the tax 
laws of Utah, any power granted to the Commission by 
the Legislature which is not specifically limited to one 
particular type of tax must be construed as being in 
furtherance of the Commission's constitutional duty to 
administer and supervise all taxes. Not only is the sub-
poena power not limited to any one particular tax, but 
in specific language is granted to the Tax Commission 
in connection with any matter which the Tax Commission 
"shall have authority to investigate or determine". 
Every power granted by the Legislature to the Com-
mission in furtherance of the Commission's constitu-
tional duties must be held to apply to all tax laws unless 
specifically limited otherwise. 
It is to be noted further that this same Legislature, 
namely, the Legislature of 1931 passed the first Corpora-
tion Franchise Tax Act and the first Individual Income 
Tax Act. Substantially the same provisions of these 
two tax acts were reenacted into Chapters 13 and 14 
of Title 80, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. We call 
attention to this legislative history because petitioner 
has attempted to make a point in his brief of the fact 
that provisions of the Corporation Franchise Tax and 
the Individual Income Tax Acts specifically provide for 
the subpoena of witnesses (Sections 80-13-53 and 80-14-
56, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933) but that no such 
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specific provision is found in the Inheritance Tax Act. 
First, it may "~ell be argued that the sections referred to 
in the Corporation Franchise Tax and Individual Income 
Tax Acts do not specifically or directly provide for the 
issuance of subpoenas. They merely provide that agents 
of the Commission shall have the power to examine books 
and records pertaining to matters required to be included 
in the taxpayer's returns under those acts and to require 
the attendance of any person having knowledge of such 
matters and to take testimony. Now here in either of 
those acts do we find the subpoena power specifically 
given. Second, we submit that the reason for those two 
provisions appearing in the Individual Income Tax and 
the Corporation Franchise. Tax Acts is apparent from 
the fact that these taxes were enacted by the same 
Legislature which gave the Tax Commission the gen-
eral power of subpoena. (See Section 80-5-46 (16), Re-
vised Statutes of Utah, 1933.) The granting in those 
two particular tax acts of a power which might imply 
the subpoena power was only an evidence of an over-
abundance of caution on the part of the Legislature, 
induced further by the fact that there was at that time 
no general law applying to all tax acts coming under the 
jurisdiction of the Tax Commission which would give 
the power to the Tax Commission to subpoena witnesses 
and books and records with reference to taxes which it 
administers. 
Because the Corporation Franchise and Individual 
Income· Tax Acts were enacted by the same Legislature 
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which gave the Con1mission subpoena power, the Legis-
lature could not have been certain when the Corporation 
Franchise and Individual Income Tax Acts were drafted 
that the general subpoena power section in Section 5984 
of Chapter 53, Laws of Utah, 1931 would pass in that 
form. Therefore, not being certain of the existence in 
a general law of the Commission's subpoena power, the 
Legislature added the sections referred to by petitioner 
to the Individual Income and Corporation Franchise 
Tax Acts in order to insure that the Tax Commission 
would have the subpoena power in connection with taxes 
coming under its supervision. However, it is also to be 
noted that in every revenue measure enacted since 1931 
or given to the Tax Commission to administer subsequent 
to 1931, the specific grant of subpoena power is con-
spicuous by its absence-obviously because, the general 
power of subpoena then being on the statute books, the 
Legislature considered that general power as applying 
to all taxes given to the Tax Commission to administer 
subsequent to 1931. 
We also call the court's attention to the fact that 
out of the great number of tax acts which the Tax Com-
mission must administer, only the Corporation and In-
dividual Income Tax Acts have any such provisions as 
referred to by petitioner. The Sales Tax Act has no 
such provision. The Use Tax Act has no such provision. 
The Motor Vehicle Registration Act has no such pro-
vision. The Cigarette and Oleomargarine Tax Act has no 
such provision. The Motor Fuels Tax Act has no such 
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provision, and as petitioner has stated, the Inheritance 
Tax .£..:\..et has no such provision. But each and every one 
of these taxes "\Yere given to the Tax Commission to ad-
minister subsequent to the creation of the Tax Com-
mission and subsequent to the Legislature of 1931. 
As stated above, the sections referred to in the Cor-
poration Franchise and Individual Income Tax Acts 
may well be said not to specifically and directly give the 
Tax Commission the subpoena power in connection with 
those acts were it not for the existence of the general 
power of subpoena in Section 80-5-46 (16), Revised Stat-
utes of Utah, 1933. Petitioner has argued in his brief 
that the subpoena power cannot be said to exist by mere 
implication. Assuming without admitting that petitioner 
is correct in this statement, then we submit that the Tax 
Commission might very well be said not to have the 
subpoena power in connection with either individual in-
come or corporation franchise tax were it not for the 
existence of Section 80-5-46 ( 16). A study of these tax 
acts and particularly the sections to which petitioner 
refers discloses that nowhere is the word ''subpoena'' 
used. Those sections read alone would give the subpoena 
power only by implication and inference. 
It is only by reason of the provisions of Section 
80-5-46 (16) that the Tax Commission has the subpoena 
power in connection with any tax act and it is by reason 
of this section that the Tax Commission has taken the 
position that it has the subpoena power in this case. That 
~ection reads as follows: 
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"To examine all records, books, papers and 
documents relating to the valuation of property 
of any corporation or individual, and to subpoena 
witnesses to appear and give testimony and to 
produce records, books, papers and documents 
relating to any matter which the tax commission 
shall have authority to investigate or determine. 
The tax commission or any party may in any 
investigation cause depositions of witnesses to be 
taken as in civil actions. Any member of the state 
tax commission, its secretary, cashier, and such 
other officers or employees as the commission 
may designate, may administer oaths and affir-
mations in any matter or proceeding relating to 
the exercise of the powers and duties of the tax 
commission. ' ' (Italics ours.) 
We call attention to the clear and unambiguous 
language of this section giving the subpoena power to 
the Tax Commission in relation "to any matter which 
the Tax Commission shall have authority to investigate 
or determine." It does not limit this power of the Com-
mission to matters which the Tax Commission shall have 
the power to investigate and determine, but gives the 
Commission that power in either instance. Thus, the 
Legislature demonstrated that when this provision of 
law was enacted, it contemplated that there might be 
situations then existent or coming into existence in the 
future in connection with which the Tax Commission 
would have only investigatory powers and not deter-
minatory powers. The Legislature also demonstrated 
that it intended to give the Tax Commission the sub-
poena power in connection with matters which it should 
only hav(} the power to inve~tigate but not determine. 
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\V·e further present to this Court that the Tax Com-
mission \Yas created for several very definite and logical 
reasons. Alnong them \Yas the desire of the people of 
this State as evidenced by the Constitutional Amend-
ment, to have the administration of all tax acts and all 
revenue measures placed under the supervision and 
control of one central agency which agency would then 
be held responsible for the administration and super-
vision of all revenue laws. Second, the Legislature un-
doubtedly conceived that by giving to this central agency 
a subpoena power in connection with all matters coming 
under its jurisdiction- either investigatory or deter-
minatory jurisdiction- more efficient administration 
could and would be had. 
With these principles in mind, let us now consider 
the powers of the Tax Commission in relation to in-
heritance tax. 
The administration of the inheritance tax was not 
placed in the Tax Commission until the effective date 
of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, namely, June 26, 
1933. Prior to that time the Attorney General's office 
was charged with some of the duties of administering 
that tax. In 1933 the Tax Commission was made the ex 
officio collector of inheritance taxes and was charged 
with the duty of representing the state "in all matters 
pertaining to the collection of such taxes''. (Section 
80-12-27, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933.) Section 80-
12-37 then provides : 
''Any person having knowledge of property 
liable to such tax, against which no proceeding 
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for enforcing collection thereof is pending, shall 
report the same to the state tax commission, and 
it shall be its duty to investigate the case, and 
if it has reason to believe the information to be 
true, it shall forthwith institute proceedings for 
the collection of the same.'' 
By the express language of this latter section, the 
Tax Commission is under the solemn duty imposed upon 
it by the Legislature to investigate the facts concerning 
any property which is reported to the Commission as 
possibly being subject to inheritance tax. The Legisla-
ture certainly must have contemplated that this investi-
gation would be more than a superficial examination of 
probate records. This is illustrated by the fact that the 
Tax Commission's investigation of such cases is limited 
to property ''against which no proceeding for enforcing 
collection thereof is pending.'' The Legislature there 
demonstrated that it contemplated that certain transfers 
of property or the holding of property in certain ways 
would never be disclosed in the ordinary probate pro-
ceeding or in the ordinary proceeding to compute inheri-
tance tax. 
For example, let us suppose that in a particular case 
part of the property of a decedent was transferred in 
such a manner as to come within the terms of a transfer 
"in contemplation of death". The remainder of such 
decedent's property would, let us suppose, be probated. 
An examination of the probate records in such a case 
would, of course, disclose no information with regard to 
the property w:Q.ich had been transferred in contempla-
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tion of death. Let us further suppose that such a de-
cedent also held certain property in joint tenancy with 
full right of snrYivorship. The probate records again 
would disclose nothing 'vith regard to such property. 
Let us further suppose that such decedent had trans-
ferred property in a manner to take effect in possession 
or enjoyment at or after death. Such a transfer would 
not be disclosed by anything appearing in the probate 
records. In each of these cases, however, the property 
would be subject to inheritance tax. The Tax Com-
mission, upon learning of the existence of such property 
or of such transfer having been made, is, by the terms 
of Section 80-12-37, charged with the duty of investigat-
ing the case and if, after such investigation, it has 
reason to believe that the property is subject to tax, it 
is enjoined to forthwith institute proceedings for the 
collection of the tax. The Legislature certainly cannot be 
presumed to have intended this type of an investigation 
to be still-born. It must be presumed to have intended 
that the Tax Commission would make a searching and 
complete investigation from whatever sources might be 
available. The Tax Commission was meant to learn 
enough to substantiate proceedings to collect the tax 
due. 
Petitioner also attempts to make some point of the 
fact that this investigatory duty was, prior to 1933, 
vested in the county clerks of the various counties. 
This, of course, is true but the conclusions drawn by 
the petitioner from this fact are completely and entirely 
non sequiturs. From this fact the petitioner concludes 
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that since the county clerks had no subpoena power, 
the Tax Commission cannot be said to have subpoena 
power. That such a conclusion obviously does not follow 
appears from the fact that the county clerks nowhere 
at any time had any general grant of subpoena power 
in connection with matters of which they were charged 
with the investigation. The Tax Commission does have 
such a general grant of subpoena power. Furthermore, 
it may be presumed that one of the reasons why the 
administration of the Inheritance Tax Act was vested 
in the Tax Commission is that by reason of the broader 
powers of the Tax Commission it would thereby be en-
abled to more efficiently conduct such investigations. 
The Legislature certainly knew of the general subpoena 
power which it had lodged in the Tax Commission when in 
1933 it gave the Tax Commission the further duty of 
administering and supervising the Inheritance Tax Law. 
Knowing of this general power vested in the Tax Com-
mission, the Legislature must have intended that the 
Tax Commission would put teeth into this investigatory 
power and make an actual and bona fide investigation 
into the true facts surrounding the inheritance tax lia-
bility of any particular piece of property. The very 
fact that the investigatory power was taken from the 
clerks of the district courts and given to the Tax Com-
mission further demonstrates that the Legislature fully 
intended that the Tax Commission should use its sub-
poena power in conducting such investigations and not 
merely make a superficial examination of probate re-
cords resulting in an abortive investigation. Otherwise, 
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the Legislature could have left this duty of investigation 
in the hands of the district court clerks to be done at 
the request of the Tax Commission. Prior to 1933, 
while the Attorney General was the ex officio collector 
of inheritance taxes, the Attorney General did not have 
this investigatory duty but the district court clerks 
had it. There "\vas nothing, therefore, to prevent the 
Legislature from, had it so intended, making the Tax 
Commission merely, the ex officio collector and leaving 
the investigatory duty in the county clerks under the 
Commission's supervision. The Legislature, however, 
did not see fit to do this but, rather, placed this duty 
of investigation in the Tax Commission with full know-
ledge that there existed in the statutes previously en-
acted the power in the Commission to issue subpoenas 
and require the production of books and records in con-
nection 'vith any matter which the Commission had the 
duty to investigate. 
Before leaving this phase of our argument we de-
sire to state that at no time has the Tax Commission 
claimed the power to set or determine the amount of 
inheritance taxes. The Tax Commission has freely con-
ceded that power to be in the district courts. However, 
the Tax Commission has taken the position which, it is 
submitted, is fully justified that it is more than a mere 
clerical agency to record the collection of inheritance 
taxes. It is a body constitutionally charged with the 
duty of representing the interests of the State of Utah 
in connection with inheritance taxes and with ascertain-
ing whether all property which should be included in 
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the computation of inheritance tax is included. If any 
property which the Tax Commission believes to be sub-
ject to inheritance tax is not included in the computa-
tion, the Commission conceives its constitutional and 
statutory duty to be to report that to the district court 
together with the facts of the situation and there represent 
the state in contending that such property should be in-
cluded in the inheritance computation. 
With these duties in mind, it is difficult to con-
ceive how the Legislature could have expected the Tax 
Commission to in any manner even begin to carry out 
these duties without giving it the power to ascertain the 
facts surrounding particular parcels of property or par-
ticular transfers of property. The Commission could 
not appear before a district court with a petition setting 
forth a mere suspicion that a certain parcel of property 
had been transferred in such a manner as to be subject 
to inheritance taL It must be able to appear before 
the district court with a petition setting forth sufficient 
fact~ to constitute a cause of action, namely, to show that 
if those facts actually exist and can be proved certain 
property is subject to inheritance tax. In most instances 
where property is not voluntarily included in an inheri-
tance tax computation those facts which the Tax Com-
mission must present to the court are necessarily within 
the knowledge of persons in privity with the decedent. 
The only way the Commission can discover those facts 
and be able to present them to the court is by issuing 
a subpoena to persons who will not voluntarily· disclose 
the facts. 
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After the facts are secured, \ve submit that the Tax 
Commission has the further power and duty to deter-
mine for itself in the first instance \vhether it feels there 
is sufficient cause to call the court's attention to these 
facts and have a determination of tax liability. If the 
Tax Commission, after disclosure to it of all facts, con-
siders that the property or the transfer of property is 
not subject to inheritance tax, then the Commission is 
not bound to have any proceeding in the district court. 
If, however, the Commission has good cause to believe 
that the facts indicate taxable property or transfers 
which are taxable, it must report these facts to the dis-
trict court in a petition and there advocate the state's 
cause in attempting to secure an adjudication of addi-
tional inheritance tax. 
It is, therefore, our contention that by the express 
provisions of Section 80-5-46 (16) the Tax Commission 
is given the subpoena power in connection with any 
matter which it shall be its duty to investigate. By the 
express provisions of Section 80-12-37, the Commission 
is charged with the duty of investigating whether cer-
tain property may be. subject to inheritance tax. There-
fore, it is inescapable that the Tax Commission has the 
subpoena power in connection with that investigation. 
It is a universally recognized principle of statutory 
construction that a general statutory provision, which 
by its terms is prospective in character, will be applied 
to any subsequent case or subsequent statutory provision 
coming within the terms of that general prospective la\v. 
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The general powers given in Section 80-5-46 are pros-
pective in character. This will be demonstrated by a 
mere reading of the provisions contained in Section 
80-5-46. For example, the first power and duty there 
given is that the Tax Commission may sue and be sued 
in its own name. Obviously, this power must be said to 
apply to all of the taxes the administration of which were 
added to the Tax Commission's duties' subsequent to 
1931. See also Subsections (2), (14), (15), (16), (18), 
(19), (20), (21), (22), (23) and (24) of Section 80-5-46. 
Particular attention is directed to Subsection (23) which 
gives to the Tax Commission the power and duty ''to 
perform such further duties as may be imposed upon 
it by law, and exercise all powers necessary in the per-
formance of its duties.'' This latter section in express 
language illustrates that the powers therein granted were 
intended to apply to all taxes which might in the future 
be added to those already existent. 
The Tax Commission was given the general power 
referred to prior to the time the administration of the 
Inheritance Tax Law was placed under the Tax Com-
mission's jurisdiction. These general powers being pros-
pective in character, the general grants of powers therein 
contained are applicable to the Inheritance Tax Law. 
See 25 R. C. L. 778, Sec. 24; 59 C. J. 1105, Section 655. 
In Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Section 
341, Page 427, this rule is laid down in clear and unam-
biguous language as follows: 
''Whenever a power is given by statute, 
everything necessary· to n1ake it effectual or re~ 
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quisite to attain the end is implied. It is a well 
established principle that statutes containing 
grants of power are to be construed so as to in-
clude the authority to do all things necessary to 
accomplish the object of the grant. The grant of 
an express po,ver carries with it by necessary 
implication every other power necessary and pro-
per to the execution of the power expressly 
granted. Where the law commands anything to 
be done it authorizes the performance of what-
ever may be necessary for executing its com-
mands. vVhen a justice of the peace is required 
to issue a warrant for the collection of costs made 
on a hearing before him, it is implied that he has 
power to decide on the amount. vVhen an exist-
ing jurisdiction is enlarged so as to include new 
cases, it is not necessary to declare that the old 
provisions shall apply to the new cases. If for 
example, the jurisdiction of justices of the peace 
should be extended to actions of slander, the ex-
isting provisions for a review by certiorari and 
appeal would apply to cases coming under the 
en1arged as well as arising under the former 
jurisdiction of the court. It is an established 
rule that where an action founded upon one stat-
ute is given by a subsequent statute in a new case, 
everything annexed to the action by the first 
statute is likewise given. Th~ power to grant 
temporary alimony is incidental to the divorce 
jurisdiction. If an act. merely directs a particular 
measure to be taken, it must be understood as 
referring its execution to the proper existing 
agents, and to annex, by implication, all the or-
dinary means for carrying the measure into ef-
fect. Where an inferior court is empowered to 
grant an injunction, it has power to enforce its 
observance by punishing disobedience; such 
power being essential to afford relief by injunc-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
50 
tion. A statute authorizing a magistrate to ex-
amine such witnesses as might be brought before 
him authorizes him to issue subpoenas for them, 
and to compel their attendance by the usual pro-
cess of the court. ' ' 
See also Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construc-
tion, Vol. 2, 2nd Edition, Sections 503, 504 and 508. 
This principle was laid down as early as 1842 by 
the Supreme Court of the State of New York. In its 
opinion in the case of People v. Commissioners of the 
Canal Fund, 3 Hill's Reports 599, apparently certain 
claims for damages were statutorily provided for and 
an appeal from the decision of the canal appraisers was 
also provided for. A subsequent statute enlarged the 
jurisdiction of the canal appraisers to include the power 
to pass upon a certain classification of claims not origin-
ally placed within their jurisdiction. The argument was 
made that inasmuch as the subsequent statute contained 
no provision· for appeal from the decision of the canal 
appraisers, no appeal remedy existed. The court held 
otherwise and stated the rule to be as follows: "When an 
existing jurisdiction is enlarged so as to include new 
cases, it is not necessary to declare that the old pro-
visions shall apply to the new cases. If, for example, 
the jurisdiction of justices of the peace should be ex-
tended to actions of slander, the existing provisions for 
a review by certiorari and appeal would apply to cases 
coming under the enlarged as well as arising under the 
former jurisdiction of the court.'' In other words, the 
New York Supreme Court held that whenever new duties 
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the general powers previously granted to such board 
will apply to the ne'Y subject matter unless. specifically 
directed otherwise. 
This same rule 'vas also stated by the Court of 
Appeals of Louisiana in the case of Giangrosso v. Straub, 
122 So. 915, where the court states at Page 916: 
' ' The action of the sheriff in refusing to sell 
the property is the gravamen of plaintiff's com-
plaint. His refusal is justified, it is claimed, by 
article 684 of the Code of Practice, which reads 
as follows: 
'Consequently, if the price offered in 
this case by the highest and last bidder, 
is not sufficient to discharge the privileges 
and mortgages existing on the property, 
and which have a preference over the judg-
ment creditor, there shall be no adjudica-
tion, and the sheriff shall proceed to seize 
other property of the debtor, if there be 
any.' 
"In answer to this contention, plaintiff's 
counsel argues that this article of the Code, hav-
ing been adopted long before the introduction of 
chattel mortgages in this state, can have no appli-
cation. This argument is not sound, for the rea-
sons that the Legislature must be presumed to 
have been familiar with the provisions of the Code 
relative to mortgages, when it sanctioned and 
adopted the chattel mortgage. All laws establish-
ing a general practice are applicable to new stat-
utes when pertinent, no matter what difference 
there may b~ in the time of their enactment. State 
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v. Judge of Second District Court, 5 La. Ann. 
518; Waldo v. Bell, 13 La. Ann. 329; Clavarie v. 
Waggaman, 1 McGloin, 35." 
In addition to establishing the rule that general 
powers already existent, which are prospective in char-
acter, will be held to extend to duties and powers and 
jurisdiction subsequently granted to the same board or 
tribunal, the above citations to general authority on 
statutory construction also clearly establish that all 
powers necessary to carry out the duties and powers 
specifically granted wl.ll be implied. The State Tax 
Commission having been charged with the duty of col-
lecting inheritance taxes and further with the duty of 
investigating the taxability of property or transfers 
upon which no proceeding is pending in court, it must 
be implied that the Tax Commission has the power to 
enforce these specific duties. Otherwise, the giving of 
the duty to investigate and to collect taxes under the 
Inheritance Tax Law would be a mere nullity and the 
Commission would be in the position of having to accept 
the returns and statements of the executor without any 
independent investigation. 
The property located at 41-43 Broadway has not 
been inventoried for inheritance tax purposes. The Tax 
Commission has been informed by counsel for the peti-
tioners that it will not be inventoried for inheritance 
tax purposes in the estate of Nellie R. Mayers, deceased. 
That being true, the only remedy of the Tax Commission 
is to petition the court for an order that such property 
be inventoried and appraised. Before such order of 
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the court vvill issue, the Tnx Com1nission must plead 
and carry the burden of proving the facts to show that 
this property should be included in the gross estate of 
Nellie R. ~layers, deceased, for the purpose of comput-
ing inheritance tax. In such a case as this the facts 
are necessarily all in the possession of the adverse 
parties, namely, the two sons of the deceased who are 
also the executors and sole heirs to her estate. None 
of these facts are in the possession of the Tax Commis-
sion. Unless the power and duty to investigate those 
facts are conceded as having been given to the Com-
mission, and further, unless the general powers of sub-
poena granted in Section 80-5-46 are also made appli-
cable to the investigation and collection of inheritance 
taxes, it becomes obvious that the Tax Commission 
is stripped of everything necessary to carry out its 
statutory duties as collector and investigator of inheri-
tance tax liability. 
Petitioner argues that the general grants of power 
eontained in Section 80-5-46 refer only to general proper-
ty taxes. It is submitted that a fair reading of these pro-
visions will demonstrate the error of this position. 
Attention in this regard is again specifically directed 
to Subsection (23) wherein the Tax Commission is en-
joined ''to perform such further duties as may be 
imposed upon it by law, and exercise all powers neces-
sary in performance of its duties.'' Furthermore, 
among others, Subsections (1), (2), (9), (16), (19)~ (20), 
(22) and (24) of Section 80-5-46 do not refer to general 
property taxes but refer· to exactly what the title of that 
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section indicates they should refer to, namely, the general 
powers and duties of the Tax Commission applying 
equally to all taxes. Also it is impossible to conceive 
how petitioner can argue that Section 80-5-37, which 
refers to the number of commissioners, the term of 
office, how they are to be appointed, their eligibility 
and method of removal ; Section 80-5-38, which refers 
to qualifications of persons appointed as Tax Commis-
sioners, and further as to reappointment; Section 
80-5-39, which refers to the oath of office and the 
amount of bond to be given by each tax commissioner; 
Section 80-5-40, which refers to the appointment of 
a chairman, what shall constitute a quorum and when 
sessions shall be held; Section 80-5-41, which refers 
to the appointment of a secretary to the Tax Commis-
sion and the employment of other agents, etc. ; Section 
80-5-42, which refers to the salaries, the terms of office 
of employees, etc.; Section 80-5-43, which refers to the 
place where the office of the Tax Commission shall be, 
what equipment it shall have and the powers to estab-
lish branch offices; Section 80-5-44, which refers to 
the seal and attestation of documents by the Tax Com-
mission; and Section 80-5-45, which states the salaries 
of the Commissioners, have any more reference to gen-
eral property taxes than to any other tax law which 
the Tax Commission administers. In fact, fairly and 
impartially viewed, all the provisions of Chapter 5 of 
Title 80, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, refer solely 
to the Tax Commission and not to any particular tax law 
and outline and limit the duties .an? powers of the Tax 
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Conllilission with reference to any matter coming within 
its jurisdiction. 
The Use by the Tax Commission of Its Subpoena 
Power Does Not Infringe Upon Any Personal or 
Constitutional Right of the Petitioner. 
The grant of subpoena power to an administrative 
agency such as the Tax Commission is constitutional. 
This proposition is no longer open to dispute. Interstate 
Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 38 L. 
Ed. 1047; Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U. S. 
619, 69 L. Ed. 1119; Federal Mining, etc. Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission, 26 Idaho 391, 143 Pac. 1173. 
These same authorities establish also the rule that 
while the subpoena power may. be granted to an admin-
istrative agency, that agency cannot be given the power 
to punish by its own action contempt of such subpoena. 
If a person properly subpoenaed by su.ch an agency 
refuses to obey the subpoena, the question must be pre-
sented to a court where the person must be given an 
opportunity for a hearing before he is held in contempt. 
The punishment for the contempt must be meted out by 
a judicial agency. 
Our statutes contemplate exactly that procedure. 
Section 104-45-15, provides that where a subpoena issued 
by a non-judicial officer is not obeyed, that fact must 
be reported to the District Court by such non-judicial 
officer, and the court will proceed in accordance with 
the statutory provisions to an adjudication of whether 
a contempt has been committed. 
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Petitioner, at Pages 10 to 15 of his brief, cites many 
cases. It is not clear to us exactly upon what proposition 
petitioner contends these cases to be authority. In fact, 
we submit that the cases are either wholly immaterial 
to the issues in the case at bar, or are authority for the 
position urged by defendants. The only common thread 
seemingly running through all these decisions cited by 
petitioner is the proposition that inquiries cannot be 
allowed to infringe upon constitutional guarantee of 
freedom and privacy. With this proposition defendants 
have no guarrel. 
Let us, however, analyze the cases cited by petitioner: 
In the case of In re Pacific Railroad Commission, 
32 Fed. 241, the investigatory commission had sub-
poenaed Mr. Leland Stanford to appear before it and 
testify with reference to certain matters. Mr. Stan-
ford appeared in response to the subpoena, but during 
the course of the examination, he refused to answer 
certain questions which, he contended, had no bearing 
upon the inquiries which the Commission was empowered 
to make, and referred only to his personal and private 
affairs. The Commission applied for an order of the 
District Court to require Mr. Stanford to answer the 
questions propounded. The District Court seemed, in 
that case, to base its opinion, first, upon the proposition 
that the Federal Judiciary could not constitutionally 
be required to aid such an investigatory body by giving 
force to its subpoena; and, second, that in any event, the 
questions were not proper and were beyond the scope 
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of the powers of investigation invested in the Commis-
sion, or in other words, went beyond the subject matter 
which the Commission was entitled to investigate. The 
decision is no longer law on the first proposition but 
has been overruled so far as that ground of the opinion 
goes by the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v. 
Brimson, supra. The Brimson case holds that the Fed-
eral Judiciary can be required by Congress to enforce 
subpoenas of administrative agencies. The Pacific Rail-
road Commission case has been cited in subsequent cases 
only for the proposition that where a witness who has 
responded to a subpoena refuses to answer questions 
upon the ground of constitutional guarantee, the court 
to whom application is made to force the witness to an-
swer will consider whether the questions are proper, and 
if found to be too broad in their scope or if found to be 
beyond the power of the agencies asking the question, 
the· court will so decide and the witness will not be com-
pelled to answer. 
The case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 
29 L. Ed. 7 46, involved a criminal prosecution for viola-
tion of duty laws. The law in question provided that the 
person against whom the proceeding was had could be re-
quired to produce evidence necessary to convict him of 
the offense, that if he did not produce the evidence in re-
sponse to the subpoena of the Government, he would be 
held to have admitted the allegations with reference to 
which the evidence was sought to be produced. In this 
case, at the trial, the Government subpoenaed the defend-
ant to produce certain vouchers. T.he defenpant proquced 
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the vouchers but objected to their admission into evidence 
on the ground that the law requiring him to produce evi-
dence against himself would violate both the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. The court ruled 
with the defendant in that case and held that in view of the 
Fifth Amendment providing that ''no person shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself,'' the defendant could not be required to produce 
evidence which would assist in convicting him of the of-
fense charged. 
In the case of In re Klein, 138 Misc. Rep. 282, 245 
N. Y. S. 486, the permanent receiver did not follow the 
statutory method set out for issuing a subpoena; namely, 
that the receiver should apply to the court and upon good 
cause shown, the court would issue the subpoena. The 
receiver there attempted to issue the subpoena himself. 
the court held that since the subpoena was not issued in 
accordance with statute, it was of no force and effect. 
Further ground for the holding was that the subpoena 
had not, in any event, been signed by the receiver, and 
that since the statute required that it be signed, it could 
not possibly have any validity. 
In the cases of Federal Trade Commission v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Company, 264 U. S. 298, 68 L. Ed. 696; 
Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U.S. 
407, 53 L. Ed. 253; United States v. Louisville and Nash-
ville R. Co., 236 U. S. 318, 59 L. Ed. 598; and Federal 
Trade Commission v. P. Lorillard Company, 283 Fed. 
999, the sole question was whether a witness who had re-
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sponded to a subpoena of the Commission and who had 
appeared and was testifying, but who refused to answer 
a particular question on the grounds that it was beyond 
the scope of the inquiry which the Commission was em-
powered to make, could be forced to answer the ques-
tion. In each case, the court, after finding that the ques-
tions were not proper and were not related to matters 
which the Commission had authority to inquire into, of 
course held that the witness could not be required to 
answer. 
In the case of Ward Baking Company v. Western 
Union Tel. Co., 205 App. Div. 723, 200 N. Y. S. 865, the" 
court refused to enforce a subpoena issued by the At~ 
torney General on the ground that a criminal investiga-
tion, which the Attorney General was there attempting 
to make, could be made under New York Law only by one 
body, namely, the Grand Jury, and that since the At-
torney General had no statutory or other authority to 
make a criminal investigation, he had no subpoena power 
in connection with such an attempted investigation. 
In the Kilbourn v. Thompson case, 103 U. S. 168, 26 
L. Ed. 377, the court held that since the investigation 
which Congress was attempting to make was not related 
to any proposed legislation, and since, further, it was 
judicial in its nature, it was beyond the power of Con-
gress and, therefore, the subpoena had no force and ef-
fect. 
The case of In re Investigation of Contracts, 113 
' . 
Misc. 370, 184 N. Y. S. 518, upholds the subpoena power 
' ' 
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granted by the Legislature of the State of New York to 
the Commission Counsel of Albany, but holds that since 
the law granting the subpoena power gave that power 
only to certain persons (namely, city officials) and with 
reference to certain documents (documents of record), the 
subpoena in question, which was issued to a private indi-
vidual to produce his private records, was not within the 
scope of the statute. The court further holds that even 
if they interpreted the law to allow the subpoena to be 
issued to the person and for the purposes for which it 
was issued, nevertheless the subpoena in this case was 
invalid because it was not signed by the president of 
the Common Counsel of Albany as specifically required 
by the law. ~ 
The case of In re Barnes, 204 N. Y. 108, 97 N. E. 508, 
upholds the subpoena power, but the situation was the 
same as in the Federal Trade Commission cases, namely, 
that questions which were asked by the investigatory 
body were held by the court to be not related to the sub-
ject which the body was empowered to investigate and, 
hence, being too broad, the witness would not be required 
to answer. It is to be noted, however, that there was 
in that case a very vigorous dissent on the question of 
whether the propounded inquiries were pertinent. 
The cases of Go-Bart Importing Company v. United 
States, 282 U. S. 344, 75 L. Ed. 374; Grau v. United 
States, 287 U. S. 124, 77 L. Ed. 212; and Sgro v. United 
States, 287 U. S. 206, 77 L. Ed. 260, all involved the same 
situation. In each of these cases the defendant-appellant 
had been charged with violation of the National Prohi-
, ' 
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bition .... \ct. In each case there had been an illegal search 
and seizure \Yithout a valid search warrant or without 
any search \Yarrant at all, by \vhich search and seizure 
certain articles, which the Government attempted to use 
in evidence, had been seized. When the Government of-
fered the articles so seized in evidence, the defendant in 
each case objected to the introduction of the evidence on 
the grounds that it had been procured by an illegal search 
and seizure in violation of the Constitution. In each 
case the District Court had allowed the evidence to be 
introduced over the objection, and the Supreme Court 
reversed the cases on the grounds that such evidence 
could not be introduced in a criminal proceeding. 
We submit, therefore, that from the above analysis 
of the cases cited by petitioner, it is demonstrated that 
none of these cases has anything to do with the situa-
tion at bar. 
One group of the cases deals with criminal matters 
and the introduction of evidence in criminal proceed-
ings, which evidence the defendant has been forced, in 
one way or another, to give against himself. The propo-
sition that a defendant in a criminal case cannot be re-
quired to testify or give evidence against himself is 
unquestioned, but has no bearing on the situation at bar. 
Others of the cases deal only with the proposition 
that where the subpoena is not legally issued in accord-
ance with statutory requirements, it is an invalid sub-
poena. Since no claim is made in the case at bar that the 
subpoena was not legally issued so far as formal re-
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quirements are concerned, those cases have no material-
ity here. 
The rest of the cases may generally be grouped as 
holding that where a witness appears in response to a sub-
poena issued by an administrative body, he may refuse to 
answer a question if the question goes beyond the scope of 
the subject matter which the body is entitled to inquire in-
to, or if the question would violate any constitutional guar-
antee of personal security and freedom. With this group 
of cases we have no quarrel, and if material in the situa-
tion at bar, we submit that they are authority for af-
firming the action of the District Court in this case. 
In the first instance, this latter group of cases cited 
by petitioner all uphold the subpoena power when the 
subpoena is issued by an administrative body in con-
nection with matters which it has the statutory duty or 
power to inquire into and investigate. Secondly, these 
cases demonstrate that petitioner could not possibly be 
placed at any disadvantage before the Tax Commission 
in response to the subpoena issued because, should the 
Tax Commission propound any inquiry to him or should 
the Tax Commission require the production of any book 
or record not relating to the inheritance tax liability of 
the property located at 41-43 Broadway, petitioner would 
be completely within his rights in refusing to answer such 
a question or refusing to produce such record. If the 
Tax Commission then felt that the question or record 'vas 
pertinent to its inquiry with regard to inheritance tax 
liability of that particular property, it could then peti-
tion the District Court for an order to show cause why 
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the petitioner should not answer the inquiry or produce 
the record. .:\. hearing Yrould then be had in the District 
Court at which petitioner would be entitled to a hearing 
and be given the opportunity to present his side of the 
controversy and defend his refusal to answer or produce 
the record. If the District Court ruled with the peti-
tioner, the matter would be ended. If the District Court 
ruled with the Tax Commission, the petitioner would be 
required to answer or produce the record. In any event, 
the petitioner "\Vould be fully and completely protected 
from any unwarranted attempt to pry into his private 
affairs not related to the question of whether the prop-
erty at 41-4:3 Broadway should be subject to inheritance 
tax. 
We submit that petitioner should do exactly as the 
complainants in the Federal Trade Commission v. 
American Tobacco Company, supra, Harriman v. Inter-
state Commerce Commission, supra, United States v. 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, supra, Fed-
eral Trade Commission v. P. Lorillard Co., supra, and In 
re Barnes, supra, cases did, namely, appear in response 
to the subpoena of the Tax Commission and then if the 
Tax Commission attempts to pry into purely personal 
matters not related to inheritance ,tax liability, refuse 
to answer the questions or produce the records. He 
would then have his day in court, would be completely 
protected by a judicial hearing, and could not possibly 
be hurt or placed at a disadvantage in any manner what-
soever. See also Interstate Commerce Commission v. 
Brimson, supra. 
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Therefore, when petitioner complains at Page 9 of 
his brief that if he appeared before the Tax Commission 
in response to the subpoena, confidential matters not re-
lated to the controversy might be revealed, petitioner is 
making what we submit is a premature argument not 
present in the controversy at this stage, since no ques-
tions have been propounded to petitioner and no con-
fidential matters not related to the controversy have 
been attempted to be elicited from petitioner. 
The Petition of the Tax Commission Stated 
a Good Cause of Action 
At Pages 36 and 37 of his brief, petitioner argues 
that his demurrer to the petition of the Tax Commission 
should have been sustained because the petition did not 
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The 
reasons propounded by petitioner for this position are 
that the Tax Commission did not allege that it had au-
thority to investigate the inheritance tax liability of the 
estate and that it did not allege either that the estate 
owned the property or the value of it or that the property 
is subject to inheritance tax. 
Briefly answering these contentions, the defendants 
call attention to the fact that the Tax Commission nec-
essarily could not allege whether the property was sub-
ject to inheritance tax, nor whether the estate owned 
the property. Those were the very things which the 
Tax Commission was attempting to investigate. The 
question of the value of the property and whether the 
property is subject to inheritance tax were not· before 
the Court in this pr;oceeding and were wholly inilnaterial 
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to the question of \Yhether Alton R. ~layers "\Vas in con-
tempt for refusing to obey the subpoena of the Tax Com-
mission. 
The District Court is bound to take judicial notice 
of the statutes of the State of Utah. The authority to 
investigate the inheritance tax liability of the estate of 
Nellie R. Mayers is found in the specific provisions of 
Section 80-12-37, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. Alle-
gations in the petition of the Tax Commission setting 
forth the terms of that statutory provision would have 
been superfluous and certainly were unnecessary. 
Since the sole question before the District Court in 
this proceeding was whether Alton R. Mayers was guilty 
of contempt in failing to obey the subpoena issued by 
the State Tax Commission, all matters with reference to 
whether the estate should pay an inheritance tax on one 
piece of property or another, the value of the property, 
etc., would have been purely collateral matters which 
could not properly be brought before the Court in this 
proceeding. The facts alleged in the petition of the Tax 
Commission are all the facts which are necessary to bring 
before the Court the material, ultimate facts with refer-
ence to the problem before the Court: Had Alton R. 
Mayers committed a contempt~ 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, defendants maintain that the following 
propositions have been successfully established: 
First, petitioner has misconceived his procedural 
remedy in this case. Prohibition will not lie i~ this matter 
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and will not allow petitioner to test alleged error in the 
judgment of the District Court. Therefore, the Alterna-
tive Writ of Prohibition already issued should be dis-
missed and the permanent writ prayed for should be 
denied. 
Second, defendants contend that the question of 
whether the Tax Commission has the subpoena power is 
not properly before the Court in this proceeding. Without 
conceding the materiality of that question in this pro-
ceeding and without waiving defendants' position that 
prohibition will not lie in the case at bar, defendants have 
established that the Tax Commission has the subpoena 
power in connection with its duly authorized and directed 
investigation of inheritance tax liability. 
Third, Alton R. Mayers refused to obey the legally 
authorized and duly served subpoena of the Tax Com-
mission. His only defense of his action was his argument 
that the Tax Commission has not the subpoena power. 
Having established the power of the Tax Commission 
to issue the subpoena in question, the refusal of Alton 
R. Mayers to obey the subpoena is a contempt under Sec-
tion 104-45-15, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and the 
judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GARFIELD 0. ANDERSON, 
GRANT A. BROWN, 
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
